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  The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, better known as the legislation that 
added the Part D prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program, represents the single 
most significant expansion of public insurance programs in the U.S. in the past 40 years.  
This program expanded the costs of the Medicare program by over 10% in order to 
provide, for the first time, prescription drug coverage to enrollees.  After some initial 
difficulties in getting the program running, it has enrolled a sizeable share of elders, and 
now pays for a large percentage of all prescriptions nationally. 
  Despite the size of this new program, however, we know very little about its 
effectiveness.  One measure of program effectiveness is its success in providing financial 
security to the nation’s elders. If Part D covered prescription drug spending that was 
putting older Americans at financial risk previously, then there may be large welfare 
gains from the associated consumption smoothing.  But if Part D simply served to “crowd 
out” existing insurance arrangements, then the welfare gains may be much smaller. 
  In this paper, we evaluate the gain in financial protection provided by the Part D 
program.  We do so using the 2002-5 and 2007 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS), before and after the implementation of this program.  These rich survey 
data contain information not only on insurance coverage, but also prescription drug 
expenditures by source of payment, including out-of-pocket.  This allows us to carefully 
model the impact of the Part D program on the distribution of expenditure risk.   
  We address three separate questions.  First, we examine whether the passage of 
Part D was associated with increased prescription drug coverage among the elderly, 
compared to the near-elderly, those just below 65.  We find that elderly prescription drug 
coverage increased by 10 percentage points, a dramatic rise.  However, this figure   3
represents only twenty percent of elders who received public coverage. This suggests that 
Part D to a large extent crowded out of other forms of prescription drug coverage. 
Second, we use the MEPS data to examine the impact of Part D on the 
prescription drug spending by payment source among the elderly.  We find that 
expenditure rose dramatically among the elderly; our central estimates suggest that there 
was an overall increase of $400 per year spent on drugs as a result of Part D.  Yet total 
public expenditure on prescription drugs rose by $1900, so that crowd-out was once again 
on the order of 80%.  
  Third, we use the MEPS to examine the impact of Part D on the distribution of 
out-of-pocket prescription drug spending among the elderly.  We find that Part D led to 
only a modest decline in out-of-pocket drug spending, and that this decline was 
concentrated in the top of the expenditure distribution.  There is little evidence that the 
reduction in out-of-pocket drug spending was offset by increases in other out-of-pocket 
medical spending.  We then follow Feldstein and Gruber (1995) and Finkelstein and 
McKnight (2008) and compute the certainty equivalent of the increased insurance 
provided by this program.  Although somewhat speculative, our estimates suggest that the 
welfare gains from the increased insurance provided by Part D were relatively small.   
  Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I presents some background on Part D, and 
reviews the small literature that has emerged on this program.  Part II discusses our data 
and empirical strategy.  Part III presents our results on prescription drug coverage, while 
Part IV presents our results on prescription drug expenditures.  Part V estimates the 
welfare gain from the introduction of Part D in terms of reduced out-of-pocket spending 
risk.  There is a brief conclusion.   4
 
Part I: Background 
The Medicare Part D Program 
  From 1998 through 2003, one of the most heated topics of public policy debate in 
the United States was the addition of a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program. 
Medicare, which provides universal health insurance coverage to those over age 65 and to 
those on the federal disability insurance (DI) program, was established in 1965. The 
original program covered most medical needs for the elderly and disabled, including 
hospital and doctor costs, but it excluded coverage for prescription drugs.  This omission 
was not perceived as a major one in the early years of the program, but in the 1990s the 
advancement of prescription-drug treatments for common illnesses among the elderly 
drew attention to this gap in coverage.  Medicare recipients, for example, spent an 
average of $2,500 each on prescription drugs in 2003, more than twice what the average 
American spent on all health care in 1965.
1   
  The debate in Congress over adding this benefit was a contentious one. Advocates 
viewed the lack of drug coverage as an unnecessary and unfair “hole” in the supposed 
universal coverage provided to our nation’s elderly and disabled. Opponents saw it as an 
unwarranted expansion of the government’s role in the provision of health insurance. 
Finally, in 2003, the Bush administration and Congress reached agreement on a far-
reaching prescription-drug benefit package at a projected cost to the federal government 
of $40 billion per year for its first ten years. 
                                                 
1 Data for prescription drug spending comes from the Congressional Budget Office (2002). Data for 
average Americans’ health spending comes from the “National Health Expenditures” section of the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National Health Accounts.    5
  This new Medicare benefit is delivered by private insurers under contract with the 
government.  Beneficiaries can choose from three types of insurance plans for coverage 
of their drug expenditures: stand-alone plans, called Medicare Prescription Drug Plans 
(PDP), that just offer prescription drug benefits; Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, which 
are plans that provide all Medicare benefits (including prescription drugs) such as HMO, 
PPO, or private FFS plans; or, beneficiaries could retain their current employer/union 
plan, as long as coverage is “creditable” or at least as generous as (i.e., actuarially 
equivalent to) the standard Part D plan, for which the plan sponsor would receive a 
subsidy from the government, known as the Retiree Drug Subsidy (RDS). 
  Under Part D, recipients were entitled to basic coverage of prescription drugs by a 
plan with a structure actuarially equivalent to the following: no coverage of the first $250 
in drug costs each year; 75% of costs for the next $2,250 of drug spending (up to $2,500 
total); 0% of costs for the next $3,600 of drug spending (up to $5,100 total, the “donut 
hole”); and 95% of costs above $5,100 of drug spending.   Over 90% of beneficiaries in 
2006, however, were not enrolled in this standard benefit design, but rather in actuarially 
equivalent plans with low or no deductibles, flat payments for covered drugs following a 
tiered system, or some form of coverage in the coverage gap. The main requirement for 
plans is that they must have equal or greater actuarial value than the standard benefit.
2  
The government also placed restrictions on the structure of the formularies that plans 
could use to determine which prescription medications they would insure.  Overall, Part 
D sponsors have great flexibility in terms of plan design. 
                                                 
2 Cover Memo for Medicare Part D Benefit Parameters: Annual Adjustments for Standard Benefit in 2007 
(CMS)    6
  Enrollment in Part D plans was voluntary for Medicare-eligible citizens, although 
Medicare recipients not signed up by May 15, 2006, were subject to a financial penalty if 
they eventually joined the program (to mitigate adverse selection in the choice of joining 
the program).  One group, however, was automatically enrolled: low-income elders who 
had been receiving their prescription-drug coverage through state Medicaid programs (the 
“dual eligibles”).  These dual eligibles were enrolled in Part D plans by default if they did 
not choose one on their own.  The Part D plans for dual eligibles could charge 
copayments of only $1 for generics/$3 for name brand drugs for those below the poverty 
line, and only $2 for generics/$5 for name brand drugs for those above the poverty line, 
with free coverage above the out-of-pocket threshold of $3600.
3 
  Despite reluctance voiced before the legislation passed, there was enormous 
interest from insurers in participating in the Part D program.  By November 2006, 3,032 
plans were being offered to potential Part D enrollees.  Every county in the nation had at 
least 27 plans available; the typical county had 48 plans, while some counties featured 
more than 70 choices, primarily due to high number of MA plans (in particular, in 
Arizona, California, Florida, New York and Pennsylvania).
4  
  Table 1 shows aggregate data on Part D enrollment for selected periods since 
adoption.  In late 2005 and early 2006, enrollment in the program was fraught with 
                                                 
3 In addition, two other groups receive substantial subsidies – those found eligible for the Low Income 
Subsidy (LIS) or for the Partial Subsidy by the SSA. To qualify for LIS, beneficiaries must have income 
less than 135% of the poverty line and resources less than $7,500 per individual or $12,000 per couple.  
This group received benefits comparable to the dual eligibles with incomes above 100% of the poverty line.  
To qualify for the Partial Subsidy, beneficiaries must have income at 135%-150% of the poverty line and 
resources less than $11,500 per individual or $23,000 per couple.  This group can enroll in plans with a $50 
deductible, a 15% copayment up to the out-of- pocket threshold, and $2/$5 copayments above that point.   
In addition, premiums are fully paid by the government up to 135% of the poverty line, and then partially 
subsidized up to 150% of the poverty line. 
 
4 Details on number of plans in a median county obtained from Prescription Drug Plan Formulary and 
Pharmacy Network Files for 2006, provided by CMS.    7
problems, but, in the months that followed, the federal government was able to iron out 
many of the difficulties that had arisen during the initial transition.  Moreover, surveys 
showed that while only roughly 37% of seniors felt they understood the new Medicare 
program in November 2005, that number had risen to almost 50% by April 2006 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2006).  
As columns 3-5 of the table show, as of June 2006, there were 16.5 million people 
enrolled in stand-alone PDPs, of which 6.1 million were dual eligible and 10.4 million 
were not dual eligible.  In addition, 6 million people were enrolled in MA plans.  Overall, 
22.5 million or 53% of the approximately 43 million Medicare beneficiaries were 
enrolled in a Part D plan.  An additional 15.8 million were not enrolled in Part D, but had 
some form of creditable coverage (columns 7-8).  Of these, 6.8 million had 
employer/union coverage that was subsidized through the Retiree Drug Subsidy (RDS) 
part of the Medicare Modernization Act.  In all, only 4.4 million or roughly 10% of 
Medicare beneficiaries had no prescription drug coverage as of June, 2006 (column 9).    
  Since then, Part D enrollment has grown, up from 53% to 59% of Medicare 
beneficiaries by March, 2009.  Most of this growth has come from increased participation 
in Medicare Advantage drug plans.  There has been a noticeable recent decline in 
creditable employer/union coverage.  In 2009, those with employer/union-provided RDS 
coverage was 6 million, roughly similar to the number in 2006, indicating that much of 
the recent decline in creditable coverage has come from unsubsidized employers/unions 
and suggesting some medium-term crowd-out effects.  
 
Other Research on Part D   8
  The small literature that has emerged on the Medicare Part D program has 
investigated primarily two issues.  The first is the determinants, and efficacy, of decisions 
to enroll in the program and which plan to choose.   In Heiss, McFadden, and Winter 
(2006), a team of researchers surveyed elders to assess whether enrollment intentions in 
the plan were “rational” given the penalties for delay.  They found that 71% of potential 
enrollees made the appropriate decision (under various assumptions about discount rates, 
etc.), while 10% of enrollees did not intend to enroll when it would have been in their 
interests to do have done so, and 19% intended to enroll when it would have been in their 
interest to have delayed.  Their findings are less sanguine, however, for choice of Part D 
plan.  This survey offered individuals a choice of the standard plan described above 
versus alternatives that provided different levels of insurance coverage (e.g. catastrophic 
only, complete coverage, etc.), with corresponding actuarially fair premiums.  They 
found that only about 36% of enrollees chose the cost-minimizing plan, and did not place 
much value on the insurance aspects of more comprehensive plans.  They concluded that 
“consumers are likely to have difficulty choosing among plans to fine-tune their 
prescription drug coverage, and do not seem to be informed about or attuned to the 
insurance feature of Part D plans.”   
  Abaluck and Gruber (2009) undertook a more detailed assessment of plan choice 
with data on the prescription-drug utilization and plan enrollment decisions of a large 
sample of elders, for whom they have prescription claims records.  They estimated a 
discrete choice model that highlights three key anomalies in plan choices.  First, elders 
dramatically underweighted their expected out-of-pocket costs across plans relative to 
their premium costs.  Second, elders paid attention to plan characteristics, such as donut-  9
hole coverage, in making plan choices, but only in a general sense and not really as it 
applies to them.  For example, the share of elders who chose donut-hole coverage was 
largely invariant in the level of prescription-drug spending.  Finally, there was very little 
attention paid to the variance the elders faced in their drug expenditures under different 
plans.  As a result, Abaluck and Gruber found that the vast majority of elders were not 
making cost-minimizing plan choices. 
  The second set of articles on Part D evaluates the impacts of the plan on 
prescription-drug utilization.  These studies all suggest large utilization effects, but the 
magnitudes differ considerably.  Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) found that Medicare Part D 
increased utilization of prescription drugs by the elderly by about 13%, and raised total 
U.S. prescription drug utilization by almost 5%.  Yin et al. (2008) estimated a more 
modest increase in utilization of 5.9%, with a decline in out-of-pocket expenditures of 
over 13%.  Ketcham and Simon (2008) found a decline in out-of-pocket costs for the 
elderly of 17%, and an increase of 8% in total prescription-drug spending (from all 
payment sources).  Duggan and Scott-Morton (2008) found a very large increase of over 
50% in prescription-drug utilization among the elderly. 
  We are aware of only two studies that address the issue of how Part D has 
affected financial security.  Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) also investigated the source of 
payments for prescriptions.  They found that for every seven new prescriptions paid for 
by the government, there was a reduction of five prescriptions paid for by the private 
sector.  This implied a very large “crowd-out” of private insurance by this new program, 
a topic that we explore further below.   10
  Most relevant for our paper is a recent study by Levy and Weir (2009), who used 
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine Part D enrollment and a 
limited form of crowd-out.  Their results for enrollment are consistent with our findings 
below, but their definition of crowd-out differs from ours.  They define dropped coverage 
as crowd-out, whereas our definition is broader, encompassing the provision of public 
coverage that may overlap with private coverage.  In so doing, they neither investigated 
in any detail the extent to which Part D coverage provides a net increase in insurance 
coverage, nor the impacts on financial protection of the program.  Indeed, as stated in the 
conclusion to that paper, “A full evaluation of the impact of Part D must include an 
evaluation of how these changes affect the health and financial security of the elderly as 
well”.  Our paper focuses on these financial security implications. 
 
Other Related Literature 
  Our paper also draws on two other literatures in health economics.  The first is the 
broader literature on the crowd-out of private health coverage by public insurance, mostly 
focused on expansions of the Medicaid program for low-income families since the mid-
1980s.  This literature is reviewed in Gruber and Simon (2008).  While estimates vary, 
there is a broad consensus that there was significant crowd-out of private insurance by the 
Medicaid expansions.  Gruber and Simon’s estimate, which is at the high end of the 
literature, suggests that for every 100 persons gaining public coverage, 60 lost private 
coverage, or a crowd-out rate of 60%. 
  The second is the literature on the financial protection role of insurance.  Our 
central reference here is Finkelstein and McKnight (2008), who studied the impact of   11
introducing the Medicare program itself in the mid-1960s on both health and out-of-
pocket medical spending.  They found few impacts of this program on health, but 
strikingly large impacts in terms of reducing the risk of out-of-pocket spending.  They 
followed earlier work by Feldstein and Gruber (1995) and undertook a welfare 
calculation at the end of their paper.  That calculation suggested that the reduced financial 
risk facing elders alone offset more than half of the cost of the Medicare program.   
 
Part II: Data and Empirical Methods 
Data  
We use the 2002-5 and 2007 waves of the MEPS, which is a nationally 
representative set of respondents drawn from the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS).  The MEPS is a two-year overlapping panel focused on health insurance 
coverage, health care utilization, and expenditure, and is used to construct data for the 
National Health Accounts.  For each calendar year of the survey, the sample is a 
combination of individuals in their first year of the panel and individuals in their final 
year of the panel.  Interviews are conducted three times per year (roughly every four 
months).  For our analysis, we use variables measured as of the end of each calendar year 
(i.e., from the last interview of the year) taken from the Full-Year Consolidated Data 
Files.  We exclude 2006 since that was a transition year between private coverage and 
public coverage for many, so it is harder to define crowd-out without more precise 
within-year measures of coverage source. 
  We begin the empirical analysis by examining the impact of the Part D expansion 
on prescription-drug coverage from any source.  We construct coverage by using data   12
from two sources in the MEPS.  The first source is from information in the health 
insurance component of the survey, which asks about prescription drug coverage, and, 
starting with the 2006 wave, includes a question about coverage through Medicare.  The 
second source is the expenditure component of the survey, in which information is 
provided on prescription-drug expenditures from 12 detailed payment sources: private 
group and non-group insurance plans, Medicaid, Medicare, Tricare/Champus, VA, out-
of-pocket, Worker’s Compensation, and other federal, state and local, private, public, and 
unclassified sources.  Because the MEPs does not attempt to reconcile differences in 
coverage across these three survey components (Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, 2008a), we measure any coverage as having coverage denoted in either of these 
two survey sources.    
Under the Medicare Modernization Act, all Medicaid-Medicare dual-eligibles 
were automatically enrolled in Part D.  As we do not want to treat any re-labeling of 
Medicaid beneficiaries as Part D beneficiaries as crowd-out, we define the focal 
explanatory variable in the empirical analysis as whether the individual has “public” 
prescription-drug coverage, defined as drug coverage either through Medicare starting in 
2006 or Medicaid coverage in any year.   
A key feature of our analysis is that we move beyond the crowd-out of coverage 
and also examine the crowd-out of expenditures.  To do so, we use data on expenditures 
by payment source mentioned above.  The MEPS constructed these data in a multi-stage 
process.  First, in the interview, respondents were asked about all prescribed medicines, 
including the name of the medication, frequency of use, dosage, and the name and 
address of the pharmacy at which the prescription was filled.  Second, respondents were   13
asked permission to release their pharmacy records.  For those who consented, the MEPS 
requested from the pharmacy the date the prescription was filled, the name and dosage of 
the medication, payments by source, and the national drug code.  Finally, MEPS 
constructed expenditure measures by payment source for each respondent as follows.  For 
those who consented, expenditures are based on the pharmacy records; for those who did 
not consent, expenditures are based on self-reported expenditures that have been adjusted 
for outliers and item non-response based on imputations from the pharmacy data (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2008b).  We use these data on expenditures, 
deflated into 2007 dollars using the all-items Consumer Price Index, in our analysis 
below.   
 
Empirical Methods 
  Our basic empirical approach is a difference-in-difference analysis, comparing the 
prescription-drug insurance coverage and expenditures of those who are Medicare 
eligible to near-elderly who are not, before versus after 2006.  This strategy will identify 
the impact of Part D as long as there are no other reasons why coverage or expenditures 
would be changing, relatively, for elders and near-elders at this time.   
This identification assumption could be violated in one of two ways.  First, there 
may be underlying differential trends in prescription-drug utilization across these groups, 
and this change may simply be “riding the trend.”  We address this concern by illustrating 
graphically that coverage and drug expenditures were moving closely for both groups 
before this change.  Second, there may have been some other shock over this time period 
that caused a relative shift in insurance coverage or drug expenditures.  While this   14
alternative is impossible to rule out completely, it seems highly unlikely given the 
magnitude of the Part D change.  For example, the change in prescription-drug coverage 
we see for those 65-69 between 2005 and 2007 is more than three times the largest 
change that we saw over any other two year period since 2000. 
We define the near-elderly as those aged 60-64, although our findings are not 
materially different if we broaden this group to include those in their fifties.   In addition, 
we exclude from our analysis those under 65 who are eligible for Medicare through DI.  
We employ two age definitions for Medicare-eligible individuals: 65-70 year olds, and all 
individuals 65 and older.  The former is a group closest in age to the comparison group of 
60-64 years and provides for the cleanest analysis of the adoption of Part D as a quasi-
experiment.  The latter definition yields results for all Medicare beneficiaries and allows 
us to make statements about program-wide effects.   
Table 2 gives basic descriptive statistics on our outcomes and measure of public 
prescription-drug coverage by time period for each of these age groups.  The sample 
mean public coverage rate and expenditure after Part D are 68.9% and $1,280, 
respectively.  When adjusted by the MEPS sampling weights, these means imply 25.8 
million persons receiving public coverage and aggregate program expenditure of $43.5B 
in 2007.  These are quite close to the aggregate numbers on Part D tabulated 
administratively by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  
 
Caveats 
There are two important issues with our definitions of public coverage and 
expenditure.  The first is the proper treatment of prescription-drug coverage through   15
Medicare HMOs.  Before the implementation of Part D in 2006, many, but not all, 
individuals enrolled in Medicare HMO plans received prescription-drug coverage.  Such 
coverage was a mix of private and public coverage.  On the one hand, these extra benefits 
were like Medigap coverage—individuals were paying more to get extra benefits—and, 
hence, were a form of private coverage.  On the other hand, the cost to the individuals of 
this type of coverage was artificially low because the government was cross-subsidizing 
risk, just as in Part D.
5   Overall, it is unclear whether such coverage should be labeled 
private or public.   In the analysis, we treat this source of coverage as private in the pre-
Part D period (2002-5), but public after Part D was instituted (2007).  Most of our 
findings are similar when we treat Medicare HMO coverage as public coverage in the 
pre-Part D period.  We note where there are differences.   
The second is that the Medicare Modernization Act that created Part D gives 
subsidies to employers/unions to keep coverage under the RDS program.  Therefore, the 
federal government is also promoting “private” coverage under our definition, blurring 
distinctions between public and private.  Unfortunately, the MEPS data do not indicate if 
employer/union coverage is subsidized under the RDS program.   
Consequently, in the empirical analysis below, we present two sets of estimates.  
The first are reduced-form estimates, which are the regression-based counterparts to our 
difference-in-difference analysis and measure program-wide effects, i.e., the net impact 
of Part D of prescription drug coverage and expenditures as it operates through all 
channels, including stand-alone PDP, MA drug plans, and RDS subsidized 
employer/union coverage.  The second are traditional IV estimates of crowd-out based on 
                                                 
5 Of course, the same could be said for Medigap plan holders as well, since it is well known that Medigap is 
artificially cheap because the costs of the moral hazard it induces are borne by the Medicare program (e.g. 
Chandra et al., forthcoming).     16
our definition of public coverage given above, where we implicitly treat employer/union 
coverage, even if subsidized under the RDS program, as private coverage.  Because 
private coverage likely would have been lower in the absence of the RDS program, our 
measured crowd-out is likely to be an underestimate of true crowd-out from the Part D 
expansion. 
 
Part III: Insurance Coverage Results 
Graphical Evidence 
  We begin our analysis by showing the evidence on prescription-drug insurance 
coverage over time for older Americans.  Figure 1 shows the age profile of coverage from 
any source for 50-80 year olds from the MEPS for before Part D (2002-2005) and after 
(2007), respectively, as measured on the left-hand axis.   Before Part D, prescription  
drug coverage rates from any source were constant until age 65, before dropping by about 
five percentage points.  After Part D, the age profile is similar through the early 60s 
(although noisier since we only have one year of post-Part D data) before diverging 
sharply at age 65.  This is a remarkable shift in only one or two years.   
  Against the vertical axis on the right-hand side, the graph also illustrates the age 
profile of public coverage in 2007, where, again, “public” means either through Medicare 
or Medicaid.  The public coverage rate was roughly 15% for those under age 65.  Public 
coverage then rose to 80% for those 65 and older.   This age-related increase in public 
coverage is much larger than the total shift in insurance coverage (a gap between the 
before and after lines of roughly 15 percentage points), and suggests that there was 
significant crowd-out of existing coverage by the Part D expansion.   17
  To formalize this graphical evidence, Table 3 shows data on prescription-drug 
coverage by age group and time periods.  In the first row, there is a very large increase in 
prescription drug coverage for those 65-70 years old of 13.7 percentage points, with only 
a moderate corresponding increase of about 3.4 percentage points for 60-64 year olds.  
The difference-in-difference estimate in the fourth row indicates that Part D was 
associated with a 10.3 percentage point rise in prescription-drug coverage among the 
elderly.   
  The bottom panel undertakes a corresponding difference-in-difference calculation 
for public coverage.  Here we find a rise of over 50% for age 65-70, with no change for 
the younger group.  These estimates of a 50% rise in public coverage yet only a 10% rise 
in total coverage imply quite large crowd-out of other insurance sources by Part D, on the 
order of 80% 
 
Regression Evidence 
  Table 4 presents estimates from the following econometric specification: 
(1)            
AnyCoverage PublicCoverage
it it it it D Du       , 
where the dependent variable, 
AnyCoverage D , takes on a value of one if the individual had 
prescription-drug coverage from any source and zero otherwise; the focal explanatory 
variable is 
PublicCoverage D , which takes on a value of one if the individual had public 
coverage;   is a vector of control variables that includes a full set of dummy variables 
for single year of age and calendar year, respectively; and u is a disturbance term.  In (1), 
  measures the extent to which public coverage raises private coverage, and, therefore,  
1    measures crowd-out.  Because take-up of public prescription-drug insurance is   18
likely endogenous, we estimate the parameters in (1) by instrumental variable regression, 
using 
65 2007 Age Year
it DD
   as the instrument, where 
65 Age
i D
  is a dummy variable that is one 
if the individual is 65 or older and zero otherwise, and 
2007 Year
t D
  is a dummy variable that 
is one if the calendar year is 2007 (after Part D) and zero otherwise.  Because the sample 
includes person-year observations on individuals from the same families and Medicare 
eligibility is primarily determined by age, we cluster the standard errors by household and 
age group (under 65, 65 and over).    
Panel A of the table presents results for 60-70 year olds; panel B for all those 60 
and older.  Within each panel, three sets of estimates are presented: the reduced-form, 
first-stage, and IV estimates, respectively.  The reduced-form is essentially a regression-
based version of the difference-in-difference analysis in panel A of Table 3.  The first-
stage similarly is a regression-based version of the difference-in-difference analysis in 
panel B of Table 3.   
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the estimation results from with no additional control 
variables (other than the age and time dummies) in  .  In panel A, the first-stage results 
show that there is a 51.3% rise in public insurance coverage for those over 65-70 from 
2002-5 to 2007, with a corresponding rise of 10.3% in total prescription drug coverage.  
Putting the two together, the IV estimate in the third row shows that for each 100 persons 
covered by public insurance, 20.1 persons gained insurance coverage.  This implies very 
large crowd-out of eighty percent: that is, only one fifth of those who signed up for Part   19
D gained insurance coverage by doing so, while four fifths moved over from another 
source of coverage.
6  Panel B shows similar results for all elderly.  
  The remaining columns of Table 4 assess the sensitivity of this result to additional 
controls in the regression.  We add to  , sequentially and cumulatively, demographic 
controls in the form of dummy variables for marital status (married, divorced/separated, 
widowed), race/ethnicity (black, Hispanic, other), education (high school, some college, 
college degree or higher), and gender (female); dummies for census region; measures of 
self-reported health status (excellent, very good, good, fair); and dummy variables for 





7  None of these additional 
covariates have any meaningful impact on the key results, which is consistent with the 
notion that there are no other underlying changes between elderly and non-elderly over 
this period which might confound our analysis.   
  We show the results of an additional specification test in Figure 2, which plots the 
difference-in-difference estimates from a set of pseudo-experiments, which treat each 
single year of age as the Part D age-eligibility cut-off and uses data from 2 years of age 
below and above to calculate the difference-in-differences.  If we are identifying the true 
impact of Part D, the difference-in-difference impact should only appear around age 65, 
the true age-eligibility cut-off, and not around other ages, especially those more than 2 
years apart from 65.  This is clear in the figure, in which the impact peaks around age 65.  
                                                 
6 If coverage through a Medicare HMO prior to 2006 is treated as public coverage in the pre-period, then 
the IV estimate rises to 0.301, suggesting 70% crowd-out.   
7 The omitted group is than never married, non-Hispanic white, male, with less than a high school 
education and household income in the bottom quintile.  In principle, self-reported health status could be 
endogenous with respect to the law change, but, in practice, there is little correlation between the 
instrument and the dummy variables for self-reported health status, as evidenced in a comparison of the 
results in columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.    20
  Table 5 extends this analysis in both samples to selected subgroups of the elderly 
population.  Doing so, we uncover some interesting heterogeneity.  First, we find that 
crowd-out is much larger for those who are working than for those who are not.  Second, 
we find substantially higher crowd-out for the most educated and highest income groups 
in our sample.  Both of these findings are consistent with the notion that crowd-out will 
be highest in the populations with the broadest ex-ante level of private coverage.  The 
first finding may also suggest that the RDS program did not do much to combat crowd-
out of employer coverage, but more work is needed to confirm that conclusion. 
 
Part IV: Expenditure Results 
  In this section, we extend our analysis to examine the impact of Part D on 
prescription-drug spending.  This analysis is interesting for two different reasons.  First, 
this allows us to extend our crowd-out analysis in a direction not pursued in the previous 
literature: to look more specifically at the dollar reduction in spending covered by private 
insurance relative to the dollar increase in public spending.  The crowd-out in dollar 
terms will be identical to the crowd-out in coverage terms only if (a) those who have 
private coverage but switch to public coverage do not change their spending, and (b) 
those who switch from uninsured to public coverage increase their spending to the ex-
ante average of those with private coverage who switch to public coverage. Therefore, 
the relationship of crowd-out in dollar terms and crowd-out in coverage terms will 
depend critically on the generosity of public coverage relative to the private coverage of 
switchers.   21
  Of course, the welfare implications of this comparison are difficult, because we 
do not know which type of coverage is closer to optimal insurance.  If individuals who 
are crowded out of private coverage were dramatically under-insured ex ante by the 
private sector, and appropriately insured ex post by the government, then crowd-out 
should be smaller in dollar terms than in coverage terms—this would represent a welfare 
improvement.  Unfortunately, however, the exact same conclusion holds if individuals 
were appropriately insured ex ante and over-insured ex post.   
  The second advantage of using the spending data is that it allows us to directly 
address the extent to which public insurance programs increase the financial protection of 
the elderly.  Those elderly who were uninsured ex ante are clearly gaining financial 
protection from Part D, as are elderly who had large out-of-pocket spending burdens 
despite being insured privately.  As Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) emphasize, for 
evaluating the welfare implications of a program such as Part D, it is critical to consider 
the overall reduction in out-of-pocket spending risk. 
  Theoretically, such a calculation requires data on the longitudinal risk facing each 
individual. In practice, we have instead the cross-sectional distribution of spending on 
prescription drugs.  So, in our calculations, we use this cross-sectional distribution as a 
proxy for the theoretically appropriate measure.  The bias from doing so is unclear.  On 
the one hand, this will overstate the risk facing individuals, because we are ignoring 
private information that individuals have about their own spending distribution.  On the 
other hand, this will understate the risk facing individuals, because we are measuring 
only realized spending, not spending risk.  This relates to our previous discussion.  If 
individuals were holding off on necessary prescriptions because of limited coverage, and   22
they fill those prescriptions now that they have coverage, then there is an “access” gain 
that increases welfare beyond any reduced out-of-pocket spending.  On the other hand, if 
individuals were spending appropriately before, and now over-spend on prescription 
drugs, then the reduction in out-of-pocket spending is the right risk measure. 
 
Aggregate Evidence 
We begin with Figure 3, which shows aggregate public and private prescription 
drug expenditure (for individuals of all ages), respectively, in billions of 2007 dollars, 
taken from the National Health Expenditure Accounts compiled by CMS.  Prior to 2006, 
the rate of growth of both was positive, but slowing.  Between 2005 and 2006, private 
expenditure fell 4.2%, while public expenditure rose 29.6%.  In particular, out-of-pocket 
spending fell 7%.  Therefore, the aggregate data in this figure suggest a potentially large 
role for crowd-out.   
             
Regression Evidence 
  Next, we move to a regression model for the elderly only.  Given the similarity of 
our previous estimates for 60-70 year olds and for the full sample over age 60, we focus 
on the full sample for the rest of our analysis. 
  Panel A of Table 6 shows reduced-form and IV estimates, respectively, of the 
parameters of the following model: 
 (2)             
Public PublicCoverage
it it it it XD u      ,   23
where the dependent variable, 
Public X , is public expenditure on prescription drugs.  The 
reduced-form estimate shows the overall impact of Part D through all channels.  We do 
not repeat the first stage regressions, which are the same as in Table 4. 
  We find that public spending through Medicare and Medicaid was $1000 higher 
for those over age 65 relative to those 60-64 after the adoption of Part D.  In addition, the 
IV estimates indicate that public prescription-drug expenditures rose by $1900 per person 
gaining public coverage.  This is an enormous increase, about 100% of the mean 
spending on prescription drugs in the pre-period.   Once again, this estimate is not 
sensitive to the various specifications we use across columns (1)-(5). 
  We have explored the source of this sizeable increase in prescription drug 
utilization in our MEPS data.  We find that there is little change in the odds that 
individuals fill a prescription; our IV estimate is just under a 2% rise in the odds of filling 
a prescription, and it is not significant.  On the other hand, the number of prescriptions 
filled per enrollee goes up astronomically, by 3 scrips per new enrollee, or 11% of the 
pre-period mean for those over age 65.  
In panel B, we give the IV estimate from an isomorphic specification,  
(3)            
Total PublicCoverage
it it it it XD u      , 
where the dependent variable is total drug expenditure paid through all sources.  In (3), 
  measures the extent to which public coverage increases total expenditure.   Our 
estimates suggest that total prescription-drug spending only rises by about $400, as 
shown in the first row of panel B.   The final row of the panel shows IV estimates from a 
related specification,   
(4)               
Total Public
it it it it XX       ,   24
that directly measures expenditure crowd-out.  In (4),   measures the extent to which a 
one-dollar increase in public prescription-drug expenditure raises total expenditure, and, 
therefore,  1    measures expenditure crowd-out.  The estimates of   suggest that each 
dollar of public expenditure raises total expenditure by roughly 20 cents, or that there is 
about 80% crowd-out.  This is strikingly similar to the coverage crowd-out estimate 
above. 
The remaining panels of Tables 6 show expenditure crowd-out estimates by 
source of payment.  About five-eighths of our estimated expenditure crowd-out is due to 
reduced privately insured prescription-drug spending, which falls by over 50 cents for 
every dollar increase in public spending.  The remainder is due to reduced out-of-pocket 
spending by the elderly of $545 per person publicly covered, or about 30 cents per public 
dollar spent. 
 
Part V: Estimating the Welfare Gain from the Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Spending 
The IV estimates in Tables 6 suggest a fairly small reduction in out-of-pocket 
spending in dollar terms due to Part D.  However, as is well known, the distribution of 
out-of-pocket spending is right-skewed, so that a mean estimator might not be well-suited 
to assess the impact of Part D on out-of-pocket spending.   
Therefore, in Table 7, we move to quantile estimation to better assess the impact 
of Part D.  The table shows the change in expenditure at every tenth quantile of the 
distribution of out-of-pocket spending associated with Part D expansion, by contrasting 
the change for those over 65 with those under (this is akin to the exercise of Finkelstein   25
and McKnight, 2008)).  Formally, these are estimates of   from the following reduced-
form specification: 
(5)      
65 2007 OOP Age Year
it i t it it XD D   
    , 
where the dependent variable is out-of-pocket prescription-drug spending.  We find that 
there is a monotonically increasing reduction in out-of-pocket spending for those over 
age 65, relative to those below age 65.  These differential estimated effects are significant 
from the 20
th percentile onward.  Even at the 90
th percentile, however, they are still only a 
minority of pre-Part D out of pocket spending. 
  Figure 4 extends this analysis to a richer description of the spending risk using 
quantile estimation.  In particular, the solid line in the figure represents the estimates of 
  , the impact of public coverage on out-of-pocket expenditure, for those 60 and older 
from the following econometric specification: 
(6)             
OOP PublicCoverage
it it it it XD u      , 
in which the parameters are estimated for each quantile of the out-of-pocket spending 
distribution using the instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) estimator of 
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), using 
65 2007 Age Year
it DD
   as the instrument, and   
contains the richest set of controls from column 5 of Table 6.  The dashed lines in the 
figure show the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals based on 99 block-
bootstrapped (by household and 
65 Age D
 ) replications.
8   
  Public coverage has a very small effect at the low quantiles, but it grows 
consistently with baseline spending.  At the median the impact is a reduction of $164 in 
                                                 
8 The estimates for the first five quantiles are centered around and not different from zero, but are very 
imprecisely estimated and have wide confidence bands.  For the purposes of exposition, they are not shown 
in the figure, but are available upon request.      26
out of pocket spending; at the 90
th quantile it has grown to $907.  But this is still a fairly 
modest reduction relative to the $2500 baseline value for out of pocket spending. 
  To assess the importance of these reductions in out-of-pocket spending from an 
insurance perspective, we follow Feldstein and Gruber (1995) and Finkelstein and 
McKnight (2008) and calculate the change in the risk premium associated with out-of-
pocket spending as a measure of the welfare gain from the expansion of public 
prescription-drug coverage through Part D.  Specifically, we assume the individual gets 
utility from consumption defined by the per-period budget constraint,  
( 7 )       
OOP CYX  , 
as income, Y,  net of out-of-pocket expenditure, 
OOP X , where the latter is a random 
variable.  Hence, the individual’s expected utility is  
(8)         () ( )
OOP OOP oop UY X f X d X   ,  
where f is the probability density function of the out-of-pocket expenditure.  The risk 
premium,   , associated with out-of-pocket spending then is defined as  
(9)      ()( ) ()
OOP OOP oop UY UY X f X d X     , 
and measures the amount a risk-averse individual would be willing to pay to insure 
against random variation in out-of-pocket spending.  We calculate the change in the risk 
premium associated with the adoption of Part D,  
(10)     
WithPartD WithoutPartD     . 
This change will be negative if Part D reduces the risk premium and protects the elderly 
from out-of-pocket prescription-drug spending risk; the absolute value of this change 
measures the welfare gain from Part D.      27
  Of course, the introduction of Part D will shift the mean level of out-of-pocket 
spending as well as its risks.  The shift in the mean is simply a transfer from the 
government to the insured, and so should not enter these risk calculations.  We, therefore, 
subtract the mean reduction in out-of-pocket spending to obtain the risk premium.  
Similarly, we do not include in these calculations the premiums that individuals pay 
under either their private insurance or Part D.  For most of the sample, these premiums 
will be small relative to income and, therefore, will not enter the risk calculations. 
We measure (10) as follows.  First, we use the IVQR estimates of the parameters 
in (6) to calculate for each individual (i) in the sample the conditional (on that 
individual’s characteristics,  ) quantiles (superscript j) of the out-of-pocket spending 
distribution with Part D, 
(11)      
, ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
OOPWithPartD j j j j
ii X     , 
and without Part D, 
(12)      
, ˆ ˆˆ
OOPWithoutPartD j j j
ii X    , 
respectively, for  1,..., iN   and  1,...,99 j  .  Second, we use the fact that the conditional 
quantiles are the inverse of the conditional cumulative distribution function of out-of-
pocket expenditure, so that we can recover the estimated distribution of out-of-pocket 
spending.  Because there are 99 quantile estimates, to guarantee that the sum of the 
probabilities is one, we set conditional out-of-pocket spending to zero at the very bottom 
of the distribution, j=0, i.e., 
,0 ˆ 0
OOPWithPartD
i X  .  This gives us 100 points (of equal 
probability of occurrence) in the out-of-pocket spending distribution for each person.  
Third, we draw with replacement 99 times from each person’s distribution.  Fourth, we 
directly calculate the risk premium under Part D for each individual by solving   28




1 ˆ ˆ () ( )
99
WithPartD OOPWithPartD d OOP
ii
d
UY UY X 

     , 
where d indexes the draw from the distribution, and  ˆOOP   is the IV estimate from (6) that 
adjusts for the change in the mean of the out-of-pocket expenditure distribution from Part 
D.  In a similar fashion, we calculate the risk premium without Part D by solving 









UY UY X 

    . 
In calculating (10), we follow Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) and truncate predicted 
out-of-pocket spending from below at zero and from above at 80% of income.  We report 
the calculations only for those in our sample who actually took up Part D.   
Table 8 shows selected statistics on the distribution of the change in the risk 
premium (welfare gain) associated with Part D for selected levels of risk aversion 
assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function using the estimates in 
Figure 4 for all individuals 60 and older.  For a typical estimated CRRA of 3, the mean 
reduction in the risk premium, or welfare gain, for those who took up Part D is $184.   
The median is comparable, and the 95
th percentile is $395.  The other rows of the table 
recalculate the change in risk premium for CRRA of 1 (log utility) and 5, respectively.  
The risk premiums are fairly similar for a CRRA of 1, and much higher for a CRRA of 5. 
 
Implications  
Overall, our results suggest that the risk-reduction gain was likely small from the 
introduction of Part D benefits.  But what matters is not the absolute value of this gain but 
its size relative to the inefficiencies of the program for all elderly.   There are two sources 
of inefficiency for Part D.  The first is the deadweight loss (DWL) of raising the $44.8   29
billion in net expenditures for Part D in 2007.  At a typical estimate of 30 cents of DWL 
per dollar of revenue raised, and with 31.2 million program recipients, this implies a 
DWL of $430/recipient, or more than twice the mean welfare gain from reduced out-of-
pocket spending risk. 
The second is the moral hazard cost of excess medical consumption due to Part D, 
which is much harder to evaluate.  An upper bound estimate of this cost is the increase in 
expenditure on prescription drugs per recipient, $400.  This is an upper bound for two 
reasons.  First, some of this increase may not reflect moral hazard but rather income or 
“access” effects from insurance (Nyman, 1999).  There is no compelling evidence that 
allows us to distinguish these effects, but given the relatively modest sums at risk here 
compared to income this seems unlikely to explain much of the response.   
Second, there may be offset effects to other sources of medical spending as drug 
spending increases.  Indeed, a study of the introduction of Part D by Zhang et al. (2009) 
found that the costs of increased drug expenditure were fully offset by reduced spending 
in other areas.  This would suggest no aggregate moral hazard effects from the Part D 
program. 
We can investigate this question as well with our MEPS data, and we do so in 
Table 9.  Each cell in this table shows the IV coefficient on public insurance prescription 
drug expenditures in our richest model from Table 6, akin to the coefficient of 0.213 in 
the fifth row of column 5.  There are five rows for total of all spending, public medical 
spending (Medicare and Medicaid), private medical spending in total, private spending 
by insurers, and private spending out of pocket.  In other words, the first row is 
decomposed into the second and third rows, and the third row is decomposed into the   30
fourth and fifth rows.  And we divide medical spending into eight categories: inpatient 
hospital, outpatient hospital, office-based care, emergency room, home health care, dental 
care, other medical spending, and prescription drugs.  
For total medical spending (the first row), the estimates in Table 12 are consistent 
with Zhang et al.’s conclusion that Part D did not raise total medical spending, but the 
estimates are very imprecise.  We find that there are increases in spending on prescription 
drugs (as seen in Table 6) and on inpatient and outpatient hospital spending.  However, 
there are sizeable reductions in office-based spending and home-health care (although 
only the latter is significant), and smaller reductions in spending in the other categories.  
On net, we find that total medical spending fell, but the estimate is highly insignificant; 
given our standard errors we cannot rule out a very large increase in total medical 
spending. 
The next two rows (panels B and C) show an interesting decomposition of these 
spending effects into public and private payers.  For public payers, the offset is much 
smaller; on net, reductions in other spending only offset about ten cents of each dollar of 
increased drug spending.  For private payers, however, there is not only the sizeable 
reduction in prescription drug spending noted earlier, but also an additional sizeable drop 
in other spending as well (although once again our estimates are very imprecise, with 
only the reduction in office-based case being significant).  Thus, the general conclusion 
that Part D represented a large shift from private to public payers for prescription drugs 
extends as well to the broader set of medical spending categories. 
The next two rows (panels D and E) show that almost all of the offsetting 
reduction in other spending accrued to insurers.  Out of pocket spending on other medical   31
care did not much change; the reduction in total out of pocket spending is similar to the 
reduction in prescription drug spending.   
These findings suggest two conclusions (subject to the imprecision of the 
estimates in Table 9).  First, the moral hazard cost of the Part D program may have been 
small in aggregate.  Second, the small insurance gains provided by the program are not 
augmented by reductions in out-of-pocket spending risk in other areas; the estimated 
welfare gains above would apply to total medical spending as well as prescription drug 
spending.   
 
Part VI: Conclusion 
We examine the impact of the expansion of public prescription drug insurance 
coverage on the elderly and find evidence of substantial crowd-out.  In particular, there is 
an estimated 80% crowd-out of both prescription drug coverage and expenditures.  Part D 
is associated with relatively small reductions in out-of-pocket spending, suggesting that 
the welfare gain from protecting the elderly from out-of-pocket spending risk through 
Part D has been small.  But we also conclude that there appears to be little net impact on 
total medical spending, so that the (non-revenue) efficiency costs of the program may 
have been fairly low as well. 
There are a number of caveats to these findings.  On the one hand, the stylized 
welfare calculations may overstate the gains from the introduction of Part D if there are 
other consumption-smoothing mechanisms available to the elderly, such as private 
income transfers, own savings, or uncompensated medical care.  On the other hand, the 
gains from Part D may be understated because the calculations were based on an annual,   32
rather than lifetime, measure of expenditure risk.  In particular, there is some evidence 
that lifetime medical spending risk is greater than annual risk, because out-of-pocket 
expenditures are highly persistent over time (Feenberg and Skinner, 1994; French and 
Jones, 2004). 
Finally, the welfare calculations were predicated on the assumption that 
individuals do not value any improvements in health associated with increased 
prescription drug spending, either out-of pocket or from other sources.  Yet one of our 
most important findings was that there was an enormous increase in public drug 
spending, focused on the intensive margin.  To the extent there are associated health 
gains and they are valued, our estimates will understate the true gains from the 
introduction of Part D.  While an analysis of any gains in health from Part D is beyond 
the scope of the current paper, this is clearly an avenue for future research.    33
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Table 1. 
Aggregate Data on Medicare Part D Enrollment in Millions for Selected Periods Since Adoption, and as a Percent of all Medicare 
Beneficiaries in Parentheses 
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 




    
Stand-Alone Prescription  




























June,  2006  43.0    22.5 16.5  10.4  6.1  6.0  10.4  5.4  4.4 
     (53%)  (38%)  (24%)  (14%)  (14%)    (24%)  (13%)  (10%) 
                      
June,  2007  44.0    23.9 17.3  11.0  6.3  6.7  10.3  4.9  4.0 
     (54%)  (41%)  (26%)  (15%)  (16%)    (24%)  (11%)  (9%) 
                      
February,  2008 44.2    25.4 17.4  11.2  6.2  8.0  10.2  4.0  4.6 
     (57%)  (39%)  (25%)  (14%)  (18%)    (23%)  (9%)  (10%) 
                      
March, 2009  45.2    26.7  17.5  11.2  6.3  9.2    7.9  6.2  4.5 
     (59%)  (39%)  (25%)  (14%)  (20%)    (18%)  (14%)  (10%) 
Note: Taken from Kaiser Family Foundation’s Medicare Fact Sheet: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit (various months). 
Column 3 includes employer/union only direct contract PDPs, which incorporate or wrap around public coverage.  Column 7 includes 
employer/union plans for retired workers that do and do not receive the Retiree Drug Subsidy (RDS) under Part D, as well as
TRICARE and FEHBP coverage.  Column 8 includes coverage from state pharmacy assistance programs (SPAP), Indian Health
Service, Veterans Affairs (VA), Medigap, multiple sources of creditable coverage, employer/union plans for active workers, and other
sources.   36
 
Table 2. 
Selected Sample Means by Age Group and Time Period, in the 2002-5 and 2007 MEPS, Standard Deviations in Parentheses 















After Part D 
Ages 65 and 
Older 
Before Part D
Ages 65 and 
Older 
After Part D
          




0.859 0.750 0.784 0.777  0.870 
          
Dummy if Public Coverage  0.148  0.657  0.080  0.076  0.441  0.689 
          
Dummy if Private Coverage  0.595  0.449  0.676  0.723  0.555  0.415 
          
Dummy if Public and Private Coverage  0.022  0.248  0.005  0.015  0.226  0.233 
          
Dummy if Only Private Coverage  0.573  0.201  0.670  0.708  0.329  0.181 
          
Dummy if Only Public Coverage  0.126  0.409  0.074  0.061  0.216  0.456 
          














          














          














          














          












          
Sample Size  5015  1231  4759  1237  12,262  3470 
Note: Authors’calculations from the 2002-5 and 2007 MEPS for each of the table’s groups.  Standard deviations for continuous 
variables in parentheses. 
   37
Table 3. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Medicare Part D Law Change on Prescription Drug Coverage from 
Any Source by Age Group  in the 2002-2005 and 2007 MEPS, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      Time difference  
Group/Year  After Part D  Before Part D  for groups 
A.  Any Coverage
Age 65-70   0.859  0.722  0.137 
 (0.0106)  (0.00798)  (0.0132) 
      
Age 60-64  0.784  0.750  0.0342 
 (0.0124)  (0.00795)  (0.0147) 
      
Difference-in-difference     0.103 
     (0.0198) 
      
B.  Public Coverage 
Age 65-70  0.657  0.148  0.509 
 (0.0144)  (0.00647)  (0.0158) 
      
Age 60-64  0.0760  0.0796  -0.00365 
 (0.00781)  (0.00499)  (0.00927) 
      
Difference-in-difference     0.513 
     (0.0183) 
      
Note: Each cell gives the coverage rate among 60-70 year olds for prescription drug coverage from any 
source for each of the table’s groups.  Standard errors clustered by household and age group (under 65, and
65 and older) are shown in parentheses 
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Table 4.   
Parameter Estimates of the Crowd-Out Effect of Public Prescription Drug Coverage of the Elderly in the 2002-2005 and 
2007  MEPS, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Explanatory  Variable        
 A.  60-70 Year Olds 
Reduced-Form Estimates        
Dummy if 65 or older     0.103  0.106 0.107 0.107 0.109 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change  (0.0198)  (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0192) 
        
First-Stage Estimates        
Dummy if 65 or older     0.513  0.509 0.510 0.512 0.509 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change  (0.0183)  (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0176) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  0.201  0.208  0.209  0.210  0.215 
  (0.0368)  (0.0358) (0.0357) (0.0355) (0.0353) 
        
  B.  60 and Older 
Reduced-Form Estimates        
Dummy if 65 or older     0.123  0.124 0.125 0.124 0.124 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change  (0.0167)  (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0161) 
        
First-Stage Estimates        
Dummy if 65 or older     0.538  0.531 0.532 0.532 0.533 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change  (0.0133)  (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0126) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  0.229  0.234  0.235  0.234  0.234 
  (0.0301)  (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0286) 
        
Additional Controls        
Demographics  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census Division  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Self-Reported Health Status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Income  Quintiles  No  No No No Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the individual had prescription drug coverage from
any source and zero otherwise.  The table shows the crowd-out parameter estimates of Medicare Part D on prescription drug
coverage based on the MEPS samples described in the text.  Standard errors clustered by household and age group (under 65,
and 65 and older) are shown in parentheses.     39
 
Table 5.   
Additional Reduced-Form and Instrumental-Variable Parameter Estimates of the Crowd-Out Effect of Public Prescription-Drug 
Coverage of the Elderly, for Selected Subsamples in the 2002-5 and 2007 MEPS, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 




























   A.  60-70 Year Olds 
Reduced-Form Estimates                    
Dummy if 65 or older       0.0795  0.137  0.111  0.110  0.139  0.0770  0.119  0.0765 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change     (0.0303)  (0.0270)  (0.0233) (0.0338) (0.0264)  (0.0271) (0.0226)  (0.0332) 
                    
IV Estimates                    
Dummy if Public Coverage     0.156  0.269  0.197  0.266  0.292  0.135  0.240  0.132 
     (0.0569)  (0.0487)  (0.0390)  (0.0743) (0.0507) (0.0458) (0.0424)  (0.0551) 
                    
Sample Size     4828  7392  8008  4212  7481  4739  9801  2419 
                    
   B.  60 and Older 
Reduced-Form Estimates                    
Dummy if 65 or older       0.111  0.141  0.120  0.125  0.143  0.114  0.119  0.139 
Dummy if Post-Law-Change     (0.0260)  (0.0241)  (0.0198) (0.0287) (0.0229)  (0.0224) (0.0209)  (0.0238) 
                    
IV Estimates                    
Dummy if Public Coverage      0.204  0.267  0.208  0.258  0.283  0.193  0.232  0.226 
     (0.0458)  (0.0427)  (0.0327)  (0.0552) (0.0420) (0.0368) (0.0384)  (0.0381) 
                    
Sample Size     5796  18696  13573  10919  16154  8338  19646  4846 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the individual had prescription drug coverage from any 
source and zero otherwise.  The table shows the crowd-out parameter estimates of public coverage on overall prescription-drug 
coverage based on the 2002-5 and 2007 MEPS.  Standard errors clustered by household and age group (under 65, and 65 and 
older) are shown in parentheses.     40
 
Table 6.   
Reduced-Form and IV Parameter Estimates of the Effect of Public Coverage and Expenditure on Elderly Prescription 
Drug Expenditure by Source, for those 60 and Older, in the 2002-2005 and 2007 MEPS, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Explanatory  Variable        
Reduced-Form Estimates A.  Public  Prescription Drug Expenditure 
Dummy if 65 or older     1022  1015 1015 1015 1019 
Dummy  if  Post-Law-Change  (56.41)  (56.02) (56.05) (55.06) (54.80) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  1900  1911 1909 1910 1911 
  (95.13)  (96.62) (96.53) (95.72) (95.51) 
        
Reduced-Form Estimates B.  Total Prescription Drug Expenditure 
Dummy if 65 or older     213.7  225.4 217.9 217.0 216.6 
Dummy  if  Post-Law-Change  (98.66)  (98.59) (98.75) (94.46) (94.51) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  397.4  424.7 409.8 408.2 406.4 
  (182.2)  (184.3) (184.3) (176.6) (176.2) 
        
Public  Prescription-Drug  0.209  0.222 0.215 0.214 0.213 
Expenditure  (0.0902)  (0.0904) (0.0907) (0.0868) (0.0866) 
        
Reduced-Form Estimates C.  Private Group and Non-Group Plan  Prescription Drug Expenditure 
Dummy if 65 or older     -515.3  -512.1 -515.3 -515.7 -518.5 
Dummy  if  Post-Law-Change  (60.68)  (60.11) (60.17) (59.11) (59.03) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  -958.1  -964.7 -968.9 -970.3 -972.9 
  (111.9)  (113.1) (113.0) (110.4) (110.1) 
        
Public Prescription-Drug  -0.504  -0.505 -0.508 -0.508 -0.509 
Expenditure  (0.0645)  (0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0630) (0.0628) 
        
Reduced-Form Estimates D.  Out-of-Pocket Prescription Drug  Expenditure 
Dummy if 65 or older     -293.0  -277.1 -281.9 -282.3 -283.3 
Dummy  if  Post-Law-Change  (38.34)  (38.49) (38.50) (37.73) (37.71) 
        
IV Estimates        
Dummy if Public Coverage  -544.8  -522.1  -530.1  -531.1  -531.6 
  (72.20)  (73.21) (73.16) (71.36) (71.21) 
        
Public Prescription-Drug  -0.287  -0.273 -0.278 -0.278 -0.278 
Expenditure  (0.0421)  (0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0410) (0.0409) 
        
Additional Controls        
Demographics  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Census  Division  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Self-Reported Health Status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Income  Quintiles  No  No No No Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is real annual personal prescription drug expenditure from the MEPS.  The table shows 
parameter estimates of Medicare Part D on prescription drug expenditure based on a sample of 25,886 person-year 
observations on ages 60 and older from the 2002-2006 MEPS.  Standard errors clustered by household and age group 
(under 65, and 65 and older) are shown in parentheses.     41
 
Table 7. 
Simple Estimates of the Impact of Medicare Part D at Selected Quantiles of the Distribution of
Household Out-of-Pocket Prescription Drug Expenditure, Age 60 and Older in the 2002-2005 and 2007 
MEPS, Standard Errors in Parentheses 





Age 65 and Older 
Before Part D 
 
Age 65 and Older
After Part D 
 
Age 60-64 
Before Part D 
 
Age 60-64 
After Part D 
Differential Effect 
of being 65 and Older 
After Part D 
         
10th 1  0  0 0  -1 
 (1)  (1)  (0)  (0)  (2) 
         
20th 73  45  5  5  -28 
 (4)  (3)  (3)  (3)  (6) 
         
30th 170  105 46 40  -59 
 (5)  (6)  (4)  (6)  (11) 
         
40th 290  174 115  102  -103 
 (7)  (7)  (7)  (10)  (14) 
         
50th 453  267 210  188  -164 
 (10)  (10)  (10)  (13)  (20) 
         
60th 679  395 340  290  -235 
 (14)  (15)  (11)  (18)  (28) 
         
70th 990  568 505  446  -363 
 (19)  (17)  (14)  (25)  (38) 
         
80th 1,492  846  765 648  -529 
 (26)  (27)  (24)  (34)  (55) 
         
90th 2,494 1,415  1,350  1,178  -907 
 (55)  (49)  (54)  (70)  (117) 
Note: For each quantile shown, each cell gives the real out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure 
among those 60 and older in the 2002-2005 and 2007 MEPS for each of the table’s groups.  Block-
bootstrapped standard errors by household and age group (under 65, and 65 and older) based on 199 
replications are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 8. 
Estimates of the Change in Risk Premium for those who Took up Medicare Part D for 60-70 
Year Olds, in 2007 Dollars, for Selected Measures of Risk Aversion 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Coefficient of  

















A.  Based on IVQR Estimates from the Age 60 and Older Full Sample 
1 -108  -73  -106  -141  -176  -198 
            
3 -184  -107  -185  -240  -329  -395 
            
5 -306  -131  -219  -401  -651  -829 
Note: Risk-premium calculations are based on the IVQR estimates shown in Figure 4 and 
described in the text. 
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Table 9: 
IV Estimates of Impact of Public Prescription Drug Expenditure on Public, Non-Public, and Total Medical Spending by Type of Payor and Category of 
Spending, Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses 





















A.  All Payors 
Public Prescription Drug   0.168  0.0249  -0.258 -0.0325 -0.153  -0.0259 -0.0220  0.213  -0.124 
Expenditure (0.447)  (0.0576)  (0.170)  (0.0298)  (0.0787) (0.0411) (0.0225) (0.0866)  (0.549) 
            
B.  Public Payors (Medicare and Medicaid) 
Public Prescription Drug   -0.0899  0.0379  0.0848  0.000527  -0.137  0.0131  -0.0172  1.000  0.892 
Expenditure (0.388)  (0.0444)  (0.0651)  (0.0115) (0.0639) (0.00550) (0.0105)  (0.000)  (0.426) 
            
C.  Non-Public Payors 
Public Prescription Drug   0.258  -0.0130  -0.342 -0.0331 -0.0159 -0.0390 -0.00480  -0.786  -1.017 
Expenditure (0.220)  (0.0516)  (0.150)  (0.0271)  (0.0376) (0.0404) (0.0196) (0.0865)  (0.333) 
            
D.  Private Group and Non-Group Plans 
Public Prescription Drug   0.252  -0.0145  -0.347 -0.0340 0.00748 -0.0182 -0.0200  -0.509  -0.724 
Expenditure (0.216)  (0.0498)  (0.146)  (0.0247)  (0.0327) (0.0193) (0.0131) (0.0628)  (0.311) 
            
E.  Out-of-Pocket 
Public Prescription Drug   0.00640  0.00147  0.00425 0.000884  -0.0234  -0.0208  0.0153  -0.277  -0.293 
Expenditure (0.0177)  (0.00946)  (0.0219)  (0.00686)  (0.0160) (0.0299) (0.0138) (0.0409) (0.0692) 
Note: Estimates are for the richest specification in Table 6, which is column 5 of that table.  Panel C is the sum of panels D and E. 
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Figure 4. IVQR Estimates of Impact of Public Coverage on Out-of-Pocket